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Originalism as a Constraint on Judges
William Baude†
One of Justice Antonin Scalia’s greatest legacies is his
promotion of constitutional originalism. He employed the
interpretive philosophy on the bench and argued for it in print1
and in speeches around the country. (Indeed, one of Scalia’s
speeches about originalism at The University of Chicago in
20032 was formative in provoking my own thinking on the
subject.)
One important feature of Scalia’s particular arguments for
originalism was constraint—the idea that originalism was
centrally a way, the best way, to constrain judicial decisionmaking, whereas nonoriginalist theories would essentially
license judges to make up constitutional law as they went along.
This motif appeared in various passages of his writing. For
instance, he described as one of the chief virtues of originalism
that it was “more compatible with the nature and purpose of a
Constitution in a democratic system,” because:
The purpose of constitutional guarantees—and in particular
those constitutional guarantees of individual rights that are
at the center of this controversy—is precisely to prevent the
law from reflecting certain changes in original values that
the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally
undesirable. Or, more precisely, to require the society to
devote to the subject the long and hard consideration

† Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School. I appreciate helpful and timely comments from Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell,
Jonathan Mitchell, Richard Primus, Richard Re, Stephen Sachs, Lawrence Solum, and
the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review, as well as research support from
the SNR Denton Fund and the Alumni Faculty Fund.
1
See generally, for example, Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U
Cin L Rev 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/West 2012); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed).
2
See Andrew Moesel, Justice Scalia Speaks at Law School (Chicago Maroon, May
9, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/WQ3K-SZYP.
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required for a constitutional amendment before those
particular values can be cast aside.3
On the other hand, he argued, “the central practical defect
of nonoriginalism is fundamental and irreparable: the
impossibility of achieving any consensus on what, precisely, is to
replace original meaning, once that is abandoned.”4 He
elaborated:
If the law is to make any attempt at consistency and
predictability, surely there must be general agreement not
only that judges reject one exegetical approach
(originalism), but that they adopt another. And it is hard to
discern any emerging consensus among the nonoriginalists
as to what this might be.5
The central theme here is that originalism constrains judges
from simply following popular pressures and, conversely, that
nonoriginalists will not be able to produce a consistent and
predictable system. Originalism may not be perfect on this score,
but it is, Scalia said, the lesser evil.
In later work with Professor Bryan Garner, Scalia more
explicitly emphasized the constraint of his methods of
interpretation. “[S]ound interpretive conventions,” they wrote,
“will narrow the range of acceptable judicial decision-making
and acceptable argumentation” and “will curb—even reverse—
the tendency of judges to imbue authoritative texts with their
own policy preferences.”6
But time comes for both men and theoretical arguments. In
this short Essay, I honor Justice Scalia with two observations
about originalism and constraint. The first is that originalist
scholars today are much more equivocal about the importance
and nature of constraining judges. This is a point that may be
obvious to those steeped in the latest originalist theory, but
apparently cannot be stated often enough or clearly enough to
those who are not.
The second observation, which relates to the first, is that
the concept of constraint is ambiguous in several respects and
that originalism may be better at some kinds of constraint than
others. In particular, I emphasize the difference between
3
4
5
6

Scalia, 57 U Cin L Rev at 862 (cited in note 1) (emphasis omitted).
Id at 862–63.
Id at 855.
Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at xxviii (cited in note 1).
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external constraints, which help others to judge the interpreter,
and internal constraints, which focus on allowing the interpreter
to constrain himself or herself. As reflected and refined in
modern scholarship, originalism may not be terribly good at the
former, but it may be much better at the latter. In other words,
originalism can still have constraining power, but mostly for
those who seek to be bound.
I. THE DEATH OF CONSTRAINT?
Critics of originalism have leveled sustained, and sometimes
persuasive, arguments against the justification of originalism as
a constraint on judges. For instance, in a book-length treatment
and critique of originalism, The Failed Promise of Originalism,
Professor Frank Cross attempts to empirically study “[a] key argument for originalism,” namely, “its ability to restrain willful
judging.”7 He concludes that “reliance on originalist sources is
not [ ] particularly constraining, so justices exercise their
ideological preferences in cases using originalism as much as in
other decisions.”8
But the target of these critiques is most readily found in the
work of older originalists, like Professor Raoul Berger, Judge
Robert Bork, and Justice Scalia.9 With Scalia’s passing, these
versions of the constraint argument no longer have a clear
champion.10
By contrast, many modern originalists have tended to deemphasize the importance of constraining judges, relying instead
on other arguments—that originalism is normatively desirable
for other reasons,11 that it is an account of the true meaning of
the constitutional text,12 or that it is required by our law.13
7

Frank B. Cross, The Failed Promise of Originalism 170 (Stanford Law 2013).
Id at 189.
9
See id at 11–12, 15–16, 19–20. See also, for example, Peter J. Smith, The Marshall
Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 Minn L Rev 612, 621 (2006) (discussing works
by Scalia, Berger’s book Federalism: The Founders’ Design, Bork’s book The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law, and Professor John Hart Ely’s book
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review).
10 See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: Could Fleming Be Right
This Time?), 96 BU L Rev 1457, 1472 (2016) (“Old originalists, such as Raoul Berger and
Robert Bork (at least before 1990), did not talk as I do. They did not discuss
epistemology, concepts, communication, and the philosophy of language. They discussed
such things as judges, democracy, constraint, and authority.”) (citation omitted). Note
that, in light of the importance of this temporal change, my citations in this piece largely
focus on originalist work published in the last decade or so.
11 See, for example, John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and
the Good Constitution 19–21 (Harvard 2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint
8
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For instance, originalist Professors John McGinnis and
Michael Rappaport write that while “the argument that
originalism offers clearer rules to constrain judges than other
interpretive approaches contains some truth,” it “may not be
enough to sustain the case for originalism.”14 Rather, “if
constraint is the overriding objective, non-originalist doctrine
may sometimes provide more constrained rules than the original
meaning.”15
Professor Gary Lawson, also an originalist, writes more
skeptically: “If constraint and certainty are the goals,
originalism is a relatively poor way to achieve it compared to
numerous other methodologies.”16 Professor John Harrison, an
originalist, concurs that he is “deeply skeptical of the capacity of
any methodology,” originalism included, “to constrain any
interpreter,” but adds that he “do[es] not think it is very
important” whether originalism constrains or not.17
Another originalist, Professor Christopher Green, rejects the
importance of constraint even more profoundly, arguing that
originalism is not undermined even if the original meaning is
“difficult to unearth,” “enigmatic,”18 and fails “to produce unique
and indisputable answers to legal questions.” 19 As Green puts it:
“The purpose of my originalism, at any rate, is simply to get the
constitutional truthmaker right, whatever dispute that might
engender.”20 Similarly, originalist Professor Randy Barnett
states that “the new originalism that is widely accepted by most
originalists today is not an enterprise in constraining judges,
Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice *58–83 (unpublished
manuscript, Mar 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/KN5Y-NDC8.
12 Lawson, 96 BU L Rev at 1458–64 (cited in note 10).
13 See generally, for example, William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum
L Rev 2349 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 817 (2015); William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of
Interpretation, 130 Harv L Rev 1079 (2017); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh,
Enduring Originalism, 105 Georgetown L J 97 (2016).
14 John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of
Originalism, 101 Nw U L Rev 383, 383 (2007).
15 Id at 384.
16 Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem:
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 Fla L Rev 1551, 1554 (2012).
17 John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31
Harv J L & Pub Pol 473, 473–74 (2008).
18 Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics &
Pub Pol *17 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/HXQ6-ST4N.
19 Id at *18, quoting Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 112 Colum L Rev 1917, 1919 (2012).
20 Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *18 (cited in note 18).
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but an enterprise in determining what the writing really
means.”21
Thus, it may seem as if the argument that originalism is
justified because it will eliminate judicial discretion has been
refuted by originalism’s critics and abandoned by its defenders.
The most explicit recognition of this shift comes from Professor
Thomas Colby, who writes that while “[j]udicial constraint” was
once the “heart and soul” of originalism, the theory has since
“sold its soul to gain respect and adherents.”22 The new
incarnation of originalism, Colby writes, has “left behind more
than just the theoretical flaws of its predecessor. It has also
effectively sacrificed the Old Originalism’s promise of judicial
constraint. The very changes that make the New Originalism
theoretically defensible also strip it of any pretense of a power to
constrain judges to a meaningful degree.”23 Scalia’s constraint
argument, it may seem, is dead.
But perhaps things are not so simple. One of the most
important modern theorists of originalism, Professor Lawrence
Solum, emphasizes the “Constraint Principle.”24 This is the
normative argument that original meaning ought to constrain
constitutional practice, for reasons derived from legitimacy and
the rule of law.25 Solum’s picture of constraint is nuanced,
perhaps more so than Scalia’s. He need not and does not assume
that originalism eliminates all judicial construction.26 But if
originalism could not constrain judges at all, these normative
arguments would not work. So the question remains—does
originalism impose a meaningful constraint on judges?27
21 Randy E. Barnett, The Golden Mean between Kurt & Dan: A Moderate Reading
of the Ninth Amendment, 56 Drake L Rev 897, 909 (2008).
22 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Georgetown L J 713,
714–15 (2011). For a sample denial that originalism has sold its soul, see Stephen E.
Sachs, Saving Originalism’s Soul (Library of Law and Liberty, Dec 17, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/RJ6E-CRU8 (“The soul of originalism is a method, not a collection of
results.”).
23 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714 (cited in note 22). See also Jeremy K. Kessler
and David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories,
83 U Chi L Rev 1819, 1846–47 (2016).
24 See generally Solum, The Constraint Principle (cited in note 11).
25 Id at *58–83.
26 Id at *24–28. For Solum’s disagreement with Scalia on this point, compare Scalia
and Garner, Reading Law at 13–15 (cited in note 1), with Lawrence B. Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L Rev 453, 483–88 (2013).
27 See Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 751 (cited in note 22) (“New Originalists tend to
argue that, although their theory does not completely eliminate judicial subjectivity and
the potential for judicial mischief, it is still meaningfully constraining, at least in
comparison to the alternatives.”).
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II. IT DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU MEAN BY CONSTRAINT
It is not entirely clear what it means to ask whether
originalism, or any methodology, “constrains” judicial decisionmaking. It is therefore not clear whether originalism
accomplishes it, or whether it would be a good thing if it did. So
before interring the importance of originalism as a constraint,
one should pause to see what that might mean. (Before going
any further, though, it is worth one terminological
clarification—I follow Professor Colby and others in using
“judicial constraint” to refer to “promising to narrow the
discretion of judges” while reserving “judicial restraint” to refer
to “deference to legislative majorities.”)28
First of all, there is the question whether any methodology
at all can constrain decision-making, or whether methodologies
and constraint are simply inapt, like asking whether grocery
stores help one lose weight. There are at least two reasons to
think they might be so inapt. One is that methodologies are not
self-applying or self-enforcing. So no methodology is
constraining in the sense that it can leap out of the law reviews
and force judges to use it or even keep them from deviating from
it once they have started.29
The other is that the performance of an interpretive
methodology might be related to the materials it interprets. If
the Constitution itself results in a lot of judicial discretion, then
the methodology that truthfully enforces the Constitution will
result in a lot of judicial discretion. But it is not clear whether
that fault (if it is a fault) should be laid at the feet of the
methodology or the Constitution.30 Methodologies don’t
constrain, one might say; constitutions constrain.
But let us put these aside for a moment. Even so, there are
further ambiguities: There is a question of how forceful of a
constraint a methodology imposes. Does it impose a single right
answer to the legal question at hand? Does it narrow down the
28 Id. See also Solum, 82 Fordham L Rev at 524–25 (cited in note 26); Randy J. Kozel,
Original Meaning and the Precedent Fallback, 68 Vand L Rev 105, 112 n 26 (2015).
29 See Anthony D’Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?,
43 U Miami L Rev 513, 522–23 (1989) (“The reason theories work is that we expect them
to work. But the subtlety here is that we can at best expect them to ‘work’ as theories; it
is irrational for us to expect them to work in the sense of constraining practice.”).
30 See Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *17–20 (cited in note 19);
Steven G. Calabresi and Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 Notre Dame
L Rev 483, 487, 504 (2014). To be sure, others might respond that a Constitution doesn’t
do anything until it is interpreted.
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range of right answers, but not necessarily to one? Does it
provide a process or set of considerations for giving the right
answer, even if different people applying the method might
legitimately come to different conclusions? And there is the
question of the range of cases in which the constraint operates.
In particular, does it apply in all constitutional cases, or only a
subset of them?
These different axes suggest that constraint is not a single,
scalar variable. One methodology might produce unique right
answers in a range of cases and no guidance in another range of
cases. Is it less constraining than a methodology that produces a
limited range of right answers, but in every single case? We
could stipulate either type of constraint to be greater than the
other, but ultimately these points suggest that we must define
constraint more precisely before joining issue on how much a
methodology does it, or whether it is a good thing.
I mention all of these points as a preliminary matter to one
more distinction, one that may be the most underappreciated
distinction between different types of constraint: how the
constraint operates.
Consider two types of constraint: external and internal. An
external constraint helps those who wish to judge the judge. If
the judge misapplies (or ignores) the constraint, other people
will be able to tell. Perhaps they will shame him, punish him, or
even defy him. As Judge Frank Easterbrook puts it (in the
preface to Scalia and Garner’s book):
Interpretation is a human enterprise, which cannot be
carried out algorithmically by an expert system on a
computer. But discretion can be hedged in by rules, such
as those that this book covers in detail, and misuse of
these rules by a crafty or willful judge then can be
exposed as an abuse of power. A more latitudinarian
approach to interpretation, by contrast, makes it hard to
see when the judge has succumbed to the Dark Side of
Tenure—which, like the Dark Side of The Force in Star
Wars, is marked by self-indulgence.31
But that is not the only mechanism by which a constraint might
operate. A constraint might also operate as an internal
constraint, one that helps the willing judge. If the judge
31 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, in Scalia and Garner, Reading Law xxi, xxiii
(cited in note 1).
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faithfully applies the constraint, it will help him to decide the
case by telling how to get to the answer.
In principle, a constraint could operate in both respects, but
some constraints will be more effective internally than externally. If a legal methodology is complicated or turns on
questions of judgment, it may be hard for others to distinguish
between honest disagreements on a question of applying the law
and perhaps dishonest ones on whether to follow the law at all.
This distinction between internal and external constraint helps
paint two very different pictures of originalism as a constraint
on judges.
A.

Originalism as External Constraint

In one picture, originalism might strive to act as a strict
external constraint. Through its force, scope, and simplicity, it
serves as a way of controlling a judiciary run amok. This picture
assumes that originalism will generally produce a single answer
to disputed questions of constitutional law and that it will do so
across many different kinds of cases. Moreover, it assumes that
it will do so in a way that is externally enforceable. If a judge
has deviated from originalism, others will be able to tell.
For instance, Professor Berger invoked the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “framers’ intention,” arguing that “[t]o ‘interpret’
the Amendment in diametrical opposition to that intention is to
rewrite the Constitution.”32 He also stressed the importance of
what I would call external constraint. He wrote that “[a] prime
task of scholarship” like his was “to heighten public awareness
that the Court has been overleaping its bounds.”33 And he rejected as contrary to “one of the most fundamental premises of
our constitutional system”34 the idea of placing our faith in the
judiciary’s “own sense of self-restraint.” 35 And to emphasize the
message of a judiciary run amok, the very title of his book was
Government by Judiciary.
If this was ever the kind of constraint that originalism
promised, one can see why it no longer seems so likely to do so.
A version of originalism that focused strictly on the original
32 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 457 (Liberty Fund 2d ed 1977).
33 Id at 464. He also advocated more aggressive enforcement, such as impeachment.
Id at 463. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 NYU J L & Liberty
18, 67–90 (2016).
34 Berger, Government by Judiciary at 463 (cited in note 32).
35 Id, quoting United States v Butler, 297 US 1, 79 (1936) (Stone dissenting).
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intent or originally expected applications of the text might have
been able to deliver such a constraint over a certain domain
(applications actually foreseeable by the Framers). On that
version, if the death penalty or congressional chaplains or what
have you existed when the constitutional provision was enacted,
that is all we need to know now.36
But originalists do not adhere to this version of
originalism—for good reason37—and instead focus on the public
meaning or legal meaning of the text. This sort of inquiry is
comparatively less likely to supply broad external constraints.
For instance, there are disputes or confusion about the proper
level of generality at which to read various provisions of the
constitutional text.38 And while these disputes have good
answers,39 they make it harder for originalism to serve as a
consistent external constraint. To be sure, some forms of strict
textualism, with relatively few sources of extrinsic evidence, can
be relatively effective as an external constraint. As Professor
Alexander Volokh has put it, such a method has a “high
implausibility cost,” meaning that it renders more outcomes
facially implausible.40 On the other hand, the more a theory
introduces extrinsic sources, canons, and methods, the less
effective that theory will be as an external constraint, because it
will have an increasingly “low implausibility cost,” with more
interpretations potentially plausible.41
Furthermore, many versions of originalism acknowledge
substantial “construction zones” in which “the meaning of ‘the
constitutional text does not provide determinate answers to

36 Consider Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in Grant Huscroft and
Bradley W. Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation 223 (Cambridge 2011).
37 See Sachs, Saving Originalism’s Soul (cited in note 22) (“But the old originalism
was abandoned for a reason, namely that it was wrong.”).
38 See generally, for example, Peter J. Smith, Originalism and Level of Generality,
51 Ga L Rev 485 (2017).
39 See, for example, Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense–Reference
Distinction, 50 SLU L J 555, 563–74 (2006); Lawrence Solum, Smith on Originalism &
Levels of Generality (Legal Theory Blog, Apr 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4K4K
-B3E7.
40 Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges
and Everyone Else, 83 NYU L Rev 769, 795–96 (2008) (“For instance, textualism may be
a method with a high implausibility cost if text tends to be determinate, or if Webster’s
Second or the Oxford English Dictionary is the only acceptable dictionary.”).
41 Id at 796–97 (“Conversely, [textualism] may have a low implausibility cost if all
dictionaries and canons (both textual and substantive) are fair game.”).
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constitutional questions.’” 42 In these zones, “officials must act—
by assumption—‘on the basis of normative considerations that
are not fully determined by the communicative content of the
constitutional text.’” 43
Even originalists who argue that those construction zones
can be narrowed or filled in through other originalist
arguments—such as the deployment of appropriate default
rules,44 the use of the original legal methods or original
interpretive rules,45 or the use of what Professor Stephen Sachs
and I have called the “law of interpretation”46—would likely
acknowledge that the outputs of those methods remain quite
disputed. There is no canonical book of original methods, no
codex containing all of the law of interpretation.47 And even if
there were, those methods would be subject to dispute in their
application. These disputes are not intractable or unresolvable,
by any means, but their resolution requires substantial research
and legal judgment. The same seems to be true for other
candidate theories of construction.48 These theories may each be
deeply coherent, but it is both costly and difficult for an outside
observer to say at a glance whether the original meaning has
been followed in a given case. And this, in turn, makes it harder
to apply external constraints to originalist judges.
These difficulties are exacerbated by other important
theoretical advances in originalism. Just to name three,

42 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1128 (cited in note 13), quoting Solum, 82
Fordham L Rev at 458 (cited in note 26).
43 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1128 (cited in note 13), quoting Lawrence
B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre
Dame L Rev 1, 5 (2015).
44 See, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules
for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 Nw U L Rev 857, 915 (2009); Gary Lawson, Legal
Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv J L & Pub Pol 411, 424–28 (1996).
45 See generally, for example, John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against
Construction, 103 Nw U L Rev 751 (2009).
46 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1097–1120 (cited in note 13).
47 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 9 (cited in note 1) (“The reader may well
wonder: Where are all these interpretive canons to be found? Are they tidily collected
somewhere in a code? Generally, no.”). But see id (suggesting that the book was “the first
modern attempt . . . to collect and arrange only the valid canons”).
48 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett and Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit:
The Judicial Duty of Good-Faith Constitutional Construction *41–62 (working paper,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/TXH4-MEKR. The most easily applicable might be
default rules, such as those discussed in the sources cited in note 44.
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originalists generally countenance some use of precedent,49
generally have some way of distinguishing between the
applications of a text (which can change) and the meaning of a
text (which cannot),50 and may have some way of taking account
of unwritten background principles or assumptions.51 Each of
these additional variations makes application of the theory more
complicated and more subject to good-faith dispute, and
therefore harder to subject to collective constraint or discipline.
None of this is to say that originalism lacks any externally
constraining force. It may well still be better than some other
methodologies. For instance, Sachs and I have previously
alleged that it compares favorably to “‘pragmatism’—under
which it’s wickedly difficult to tell whether its practitioners are
doing it right or wrong.”52 But there are also probably
methodologies that are still better at external constraint.
Perhaps theories centered around heavy deference to other
branches or strong stare decisis, for example, could make it
easier to judge the judiciary’s behavior, because it is
comparatively transparent when a law is being struck down or a
precedent is being overruled.53 In short, originalism may not be
the best tool to constrain the wayward judge.
B.

Originalism as Internal Constraint

But consider a different picture of originalism as constraint.
The target of this constraint is not the wayward judge, but the

49 See Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2358–61 (cited in note 13) (reviewing originalist
scholarship on precedent).
50 See Green, 50 SLU L J at 559–60 (cited in note 39); Jack M. Balkin, Living
Originalism 23, 27–32 (Belknap 2011).
51 See generally, for example, Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo
Wash L Rev 1813 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption about
Constitutional Assumptions, 103 Nw U L Rev 615 (2009).
52 William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 Green Bag 2d 103,
105 (2016). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How
Not To), 115 Yale L J 2037, 2061–62 (2006) (“[I]t is easier to spot an errant would-be
originalist interpretation than an errant nonoriginalist . . . interpretation. The existence
of reasonably firm criteria makes it easier to check up on originalist interpretations for
the soundness of their reasoning and their adherence to correct principles.”).
53 This transparency exists unless, perhaps, the judiciary can avail itself of
aggressive forms of “interpreting” statutes to avoid invalidating them, see Caleb Nelson,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 Harv L Rev
F 331, 333–39 (2015), or “narrowing” precedents to avoid overruling them, see Richard
M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum L Rev 1861, 1867–74
(2014).
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puzzled judge.54 This judge would like to be able to apply the law
without importing nonlegal considerations and is searching for a
method that will help her do it. Even if the method is sufficiently complicated or involves sufficient discretion, such that it
is hard for outsiders to use the method as a way of monitoring
judicial behavior, it can still serve to discipline and guide an
individual judge who chooses to apply it. As Professor Green has
put it, “If it matters to no one else, the existence of an external
legal standard surely matters to the ultimate interpreter; the
phenomenology of making the law on one’s own is surely quite
different from that of interpreting someone else’s law.”55
In what sense might this be called “constraint,” and why
might any constraints of this sort be desirable? One function of
this kind of internal constraint is to wall off or reduce certain
considerations that might be tempting, but undesirable.56 For
instance, a judge told only to “do the right thing” or “use your
judgment” might import political and even partisan
considerations in a way that might be undesirable. Or imagine a
judge who is deciding whether a category of searches is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment and who wishes to
avoid the hindsight bias of knowing what the search at hand
turned up. Without an internal constraint, even a well-meaning
judge might not be able to resist the power of hindsight.
Another related function is providing a resource for treating
like cases alike and different cases differently. Such equal
treatment is often taken to be a central requirement of fairness
and the rule of law. But as the legal realists loved to point out,
all cases are alike in some respects and different in some
respects. It depends on the axis of similarity and difference.
A methodology that imposes internal constraint gives judges
an answer for what counts as a like case and what counts as a
different one. Almost any methodology that is minimally
constraining will tell a judge that he ought not distinguish a
previous case on the grounds that it was decided on a Tuesday
but today is Wednesday.57 And a truly constraining methodology
54 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 40 (Oxford 3d ed 2012) (“Why should not
law be equally if not more concerned with the ‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is
willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is?”).
55 Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *10 (cited in note 19).
56 See William Baude and Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U
Chi L Rev 539, 552–54 (2017).
57 Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J App Prac & Process
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can go further, suggesting what the relevant axis is—for
instance, whether a given search invaded a positive-law right,58 or
whether a given punishment was painful and contrary to long
usage.59
For instance, imagine a judge confronted, a few years ago,
with the controversy over whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to allow same-sex couples to marry. And imagine
that the judge wishes to be constrained. She thinks it would be
wrong to impose her own views of marriage on the country, and
therefore seeks a legal criterion that does not depend on her own
views and that will guide her in deciding whether or not to
extend the various arguments of Loving v Virginia60 and
Lawrence v Texas.61 If originalism provides a way to determine
the original legal force of the Fourteenth Amendment—to
determine the scope of the rights it protects and the nature of its
equality guarantee—then originalism can supply the internal
constraint the judge seeks. And originalism can do so even if it is
not so clear-cut as to provide an external constraint. Even if the
question is a fairly debatable one, there is “[n]o reason [ ] why
we cannot conclude for ourselves that one side has the better of
it, even if by a nose, and even while admitting that a disagreeing
colleague could see it the other way.”62

219, 223 (1999):
One party cites a previous opinion as binding precedent. The other party says
it is distinguishable, and, upon being asked why, says that the previous case
was argued on a Tuesday, whereas this case is being argued on a Wednesday.
This circumstance, admittedly a factual difference, is obviously irrelevant.
Why? Because the factual difference—the day on which the case is being
argued—has nothing to do with the governing legal principles. The example is
extreme, and deliberately so, but I believe it illustrates the point.
See also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 Vill L Rev 273, 278–79 (2008).
58 See generally William Baude and James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the
Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv L Rev 1821 (2016). See also Baude and Sachs, 20 Green
Bag 2d at 107 (cited in note 52).
59 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 Nw U L Rev 1739, 1745 (2008) (“[T]he
word ‘unusual’ was a term of art that referred to government practices that are
contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage.’”). See also Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary
and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 Va L Rev
687, 712–13 (2016).
60 388 US 1 (1967).
61 539 US 558 (2003).
62 Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of
Justice Scalia, 66 Case W Reserve L Rev 905, 917 (2016).
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It is more plausible that originalism fits this second picture
of constraint—at least if it is supplemented with a theory that
narrows or fills in construction zones. Even if such theories are
sufficiently complicated that they do not easily yield consensus
or rule most interpretations out of bounds as implausible, they
still provide a method that can be divorced from various nonlegal
considerations. Originalism can provide a sort of procedural
constraint by pushing aside some arguably illegitimate
considerations from the judge’s mind; and it can provide an
internal substantive constraint by helping judges see their way
toward the right answers.
On this picture, originalism provides internal constraints by
going beyond ordinary constitutional pluralism.63 Originalism
either excludes some methods of constitutional reasoning,
provides a structure determining when other methods are
applicable, or both.64 Similarly, originalism—at least as Sachs
and I have seen it—provides a metric by which claims about
constitutional law can be judged.65 While that metric may
sometimes require a great deal of historical research and
theoretical nuance, it still allows individual interpreters to come
up with their own best assessments of constitutional meaning.
And while various forms of originalism may still call for the
exercise of discretion and normative judgment, they are guided
in an important way. As Sachs and I have written, “these are
‘normative’ judgments in the sense that they’re judgments about
norms—particularly those held by other people—not in the
sense that they involve first-order normative reasoning about
what is to be done.”66
Originalism has this kind of constraint by dint of having a
certain kind of “constitutional truthmaker”—an ultimate criterion by virtue of which constitutional claims are true or false.
Having such a truthmaker at all is the first step toward internal
constraint. Further constraint comes from the nature of
originalism’s truthmaker. The fact that it is largely removed
63 See Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 Harv L Rev 144, 151 (2016) (“[I]t is in
fact easy to discern a consensus as to the alternative to originalism. . . . [T]he alternative
is pluralism.”).
64 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2353 (cited in note 13) (“Pluralists argue that our
practice is a set of competing methods, none of which dominates the others. Whereas
those pluralist conceptions are flat, under my view they are hierarchically structured,
with originalism at the top of the hierarchy.”) (citation omitted).
65 Baude and Sachs, 20 Green Bag 2d at 104–06 (cited in note 52).
66 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1145 (cited in note 13) (emphasis omitted).
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from the most salient moral issues of the day can be a virtue
here. It means that applying originalism is a way to limit the
relevance of political or moral criteria that judges may feel an
obligation to push aside.
To be sure, originalism does not lay unique claim to internal
constraint. Any constitutional theory with a single truthmaker
can lay some such claim, and there are important nonoriginalist
theories that might qualify.67 But other common competitors to
originalism, such as unstructured pluralism or incrementalism,
may not.
Interestingly, while Scalia has been widely read to favor
the external picture of constraint, there are passages in his
writing that seemed to demonstrate some awareness of
internal constraint, as well. For instance, in an early
concurring opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co v Georgia,68
he described the Constitution’s “judicial power” as being “the
power ‘to say what the law is,’ not the power to change it.”69 He
seemed candid about the internal nature of this constraint,
adding:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to
be unaware that judges in a real sense “make” law. But
they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though
they were “finding” it—discerning what the law is, rather
than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will
tomorrow be.70
In later writing, he disparaged another judge’s attempt to
“escape from theorizing” in constitutional law and rely on
“[w]isdom” and “good sense” in terms that emphasized internal
constraint.71 Scalia professed “great fear” that such a judge who
67 See Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *23–25 (cited in note 19)
(listing examples). A particularly promising nonoriginalist single-truthmaker theory is
described in Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution (University of Pennsylvania
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No 17-15, Mar 15, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/5UQV-SQXN (attempting to derive a positivist system of constitutional
principles from social facts).
68 501 US 529 (1991).
69 Id at 549 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted), quoting Marbury
v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
70 Beam, 501 US at 549 (Scalia concurring in the judgment). Professor William N.
Eskridge Jr suggested that Scalia’s Tanner Lectures, later published as A Matter of Interpretation, cited in note 1, “can be read as a manifesto for such an ‘as-though’ philosophy
of statutory interpretation.” William N. Eskridge Jr, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96
Mich L Rev 1509, 1556 (1998).
71 Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 27–28 (cited in note 1).
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attempts to escape theory “will lack an objective basis for
judging. Do the injunctions ‘be modest’ and ‘be restrained’ mean
always deferring to the wishes of the legislature? And if not
always, then how are the appropriate occasions to be
identified?”72 It seems that the problem Scalia was concerned
with was the lack of any actual criterion, or “objective basis.”
Similarly, when he praised originalism for “establish[ing] a
historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the
preferences of the judge himself,”73 he seems to be speaking in
terms of internal constraint.74 The very mechanism of internal
constraint is the creation of a conceptually separate criterion for
judging—something the judge can use to guide his decisions, if he
wishes to.
III. IS CONSTRAINT IMPORTANT?
Whatever kind of constraint originalism imposes—internal,
external, both, neither—there remains the question whether we
should care. Despite what I have written above, I think there
are plausible arguments that we should not. As several of the
newer originalists have written, if we start with the premise that
the Constitution is binding law, then perhaps our task should
simply be to read the Constitution and do what it says.75
Sometimes it may result in constraints, and sometimes it may
not.
Even if one complicates this picture by adding that there are
multiple ways to read a text, one might again say76 that the
originalist task is not to pick among these readings on primarily
normative grounds, but rather to pick the one that is part of our
legal system, which happens to proceed in continuity from the
Framers’ law. And this seems not to turn on whether a
methodology is constraining—we could achieve far stronger
constraints, at least as an external matter, by telling judges to
flip a coin77 or to always rule in favor of the government.78
72

Id at 28.
Scalia, 57 U Cin L Rev at 864 (cited in note 1).
74 See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115 Mich
L Rev 747, 749–50 (2017) (“I contend that an insistence upon decisional justifications
external to the judges’ will, and not a naked preference for rules, provided the central
grounding for all of Justice Scalia’s commitments.”).
75 See sources cited in note 30.
76 Indeed, I have said so. See generally Baude, 115 Colum L Rev 2349 (cited in note 13).
77 Sachs, 38 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 886 (cited in note 13).
78 Greene, 130 Harv L Rev at 152 & n 45 (cited in note 63).
73

02 BAUDE_ESS_FLIP (PJF) (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Originalism as a Constraint on Judges

12/11/2017 9:58 AM

2229

But even in such positive or authority-based models of
originalism, there is a role for normative arguments about
constraint. After all, the decision to follow the Constitution as law,
and to follow any particular legal rules for interpreting it, still has
a normative aspect. I have argued (following Professor Richard
Re) that judges have a prima facie obligation to obey the law,
and hence the original meaning of the Constitution, because of
their oath and democratic role.79 But the words “prima facie”
reveal that this “cannot wholly eliminate” normative
considerations but rather can only “postpone and transform”
them.80 If originalism were entirely unconstraining, that might
still provide a reason to worry that our current legal regime was
in need of improvement81 and warrants change.
There is another, more practical point. If a method of
interpretation provided very little constraint in any sense, we
might worry that was a clue that our method of interpretation
was not a very accurate picture of the meaning it was trying to
capture. We might worry that Professor Colby was right that
originalism had become so capacious as to lose any meaning—
had become an exercise in theater rather than law. Indeed, we
might worry that such a method was not law at all. Fortunately,
however, that charge does not seem to be true of originalism,
even today.
Again, this is not to say that its ability to constrain judging
is the most important thing about originalism. If that were the
way we chose constitutional theories, we would choose
something else. But it remains of some importance that
originalism operates as an internal constraint, that it guides the
“puzzled” judge. That fact sets originalism aside from what has
been called its greatest competitor—constitutional pluralism,
most forms of which fail to contain a single “truthmaker.”82 And
it suggests that even as originalism has grown more
sophisticated, it has actually kept some faith with one of Justice
Scalia’s central insights about interpretation—the importance of
believing in something larger than yourself.
79 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2393–95 (cited in note 13). See also generally Richard
M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 Nw U L Rev 299 (2016).
80 Baude, 115 Colum L Rev at 2394–95 (cited in note 13).
81 Assuming, that is, that our Constitution is one worth being constrained by.
Compare generally Louis Michael Seidman, On Constitutional Disobedience (Oxford
2012), with Ilan Wurman, A Debt against the Living: An Introduction to Originalism
(Cambridge 2017).
82 Green, 32 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at *21–23 (cited in note 19).
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